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Abstract
The 2008 global financial crisis impacted Indonesian economy, especially
manufacturing companies due to their contributions around 21.3% to Indonesian
economy as per the United Nation Statistic Division. This research aims to find out
the extent of manufacturing company performance after financial crisis on the auditor
side. Therefore, the influences of corporate governance (CG), earning management
(EM), and firm value (FV) on audit opinion is conducted. Out of 154 manufacturing
companies listed in capital market, 37 of them were listed after the 2008 financial crisis
and 38 of them did not report their financial statements in 2008. Hence, this research
is conducted on 79 public manufacturing companies that were able to overcome the
2008 financial crisis. The result is beyond expectation because auditor’s opinion is not
influenced by corporate governance and also without regard to earning management
practices, but auditor’s opinion is influenced by the firm value although firm value is
influenced by corporate governance and earning management practices. The result
indicates the extent to how the auditor determines the results of the auditor’s opinion
and improvements that need to be made throughout the audit process.
Keywords: financial crisis, corporate governance, earning management, firm value,
audit opinion
1. Introduction
The impact of the 2008 financial crisis was perceived by all countries in the world includ-
ing Indonesia where economic growth fell from 6% to 4.5% [1](Badan Pusat Statistik,
2009)) due to company performance degradation, especially manufacturing companies
which has the biggest contribution to Indonesia economy. In 2008, manufacturing sec-
tor contributed 27.9% and decreased to 26.3% in 2009 which resulted in a significant
slowdown from 3.7% to 1.6% [2](World Bank, 2009). This crisis ended in unstable com-
pany performance which was reflected in the financial statements. This condition made
investor considered their investment decisions.
As a result, company management will strive to increase investor belief by conducting
earning management practices [3](DeAngelo et al., 1994) to create perceptions that
How to cite this article: Devie, Angeline Ellen, Chelsea Angelina, and Jocelyn Fenella, (2019), “The Analysis of Auditor Opinion After Financial Crisis”
in International Conference on Economics, Education, Business and Accounting, KnE Social Sciences, pages 257–269. DOI 10.18502/kss.v3i11.4011 Page 257
Received: 29 January 2019
Accepted: 27 February 2019
Published: 24 March 2019
Publishing services provided by
Knowledge E
Devie et al. This article is
distributed under the terms of
the Creative Commons
Attribution License, which
permits unrestricted use and
redistribution provided that the
original author and source are
credited.
Selection and Peer-review under
the responsibility of the 3rd
ICEEBA Conference Committee.
3rd ICEEBA
company condition is not affected by financial crisis. This incident becomes auditor’s
concern in assessing company financial statement. Audit opinion becomes a source of
public trust in the credibility and reliability of the information contained in financial state-
ment. Therefore, Baird [4](2000) states that the role of corporate governance need to be
concerned. Good corporate governance can decrease potential of earningmanagement
practices. Thus, the purpose of this research is to determine the extent of manufacturing
companies performance after financial crisis on the auditor side.
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis
2.1. Conceptual model
2.1.1. Corporate governance (CG)
Corporate governance become an interesting topic in Indonesia since financial crisis.
Inadequate corporate governance can lead to company liquidation [4](Baird, 2000). Cor-
porate governance can be defined as the structure, system and process used by the
organs of the company as an effort to provide sustainable value added [5](IICG, 2010).
Corporate governance regulates tasks, rights and obligations to thosewhom contributes
in the company sustainability. Behavior of both internal and external parties will deter-
mine corporate governance quality.
2.1.2. Earning management (EM)
In economic hardship such as financial crisis, earning management becomes a tool
for management to manage numbers in financial statement as the impact of crisis
[6](Berndt and Offenhammer, 2011). Earning management is a practice of income or
income identification time so that income streams changed but does not increase in
long term [7](Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995). Earnings management occurs when man-
agers use valuations in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to change
financial statements both mislead some stakeholders about the economic performance
that underlies the company and affect the outcome of contracts that depend on the
accounting numbers reported [8] (Healy & Wahlen, 1999).
The nature of accrual accounting gives managers the wisdom in determining the
actual profit reported by the company. The manager can change the recognition time
of income and expenses. In this case, managers will most likely be involved in earnings
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management because they have the power to control financial statements [9] (Goel,
2016).
2.1.3. Firm value (FV)
Company long term goal is to optimize the company value by minimizing costs of cap-
ital. Higher value will be followed by higher shareholder’s prosperity [10] (Brigham and
Gapenski, 1996). There are three types of valuation related to stocks: book value, market
value and intrinsic value. This valuation aims to increase investor awareness when mak-
ing investment decisions [11]. Higher value can create public trust in company prospects
in the future.
2.1.4. Audit opinion (AO)
Auditor is in charge of forming an opinion based on the evaluation of conclusions drawn
from the audit evidence obtained and clearly states that opinion through awritten report.
The opinion formed must be qualified and unqualified. Audit is an efficient mechanism
which can determine whether the manager is running in accordance with the interests
of shareholders or not [12] (Rezaei and Shahroodi, 2015).
2.2. Hypothesis development
Characteristics of corporate governance and the legal system of investor protection
can also influence the role of legal auditors [13] (Piot, 2001). [14] argue that high accrual
companies are more likely to experience future earnings reversals and SEC enforce-
ment actions for GAAP violations, but investors do not appear to anticipate these
consequences. This enforcement is based on audit opinion on the company’s financial
statements. The results of earnings quality test and the credibility of financial reporting,
they found no evidence that auditors indicated the possibility of higher GAAP violations
through their audit opinions.
H1: Corporate governance has an influence on audit opinion.
Based on previous research related to the relationship between earnings man-
agement and certain corporate governance practices, including the composition of
the board and audit committee, the relationship between Corporate Governance and
Earning Management is inversely proportional, earnings management will decrease
along with the increase in corporate governance [15–21] (Agrawal and Chadha, 2005;
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Beasley, 1996; Chtourou et al., 2001; Davidson et al., 2005; Klein, 2002; Peasnell et al.,
2005; Vafeas, 2005).
According to [22], there are three main factors that influence the company activi-
ties in relation to the relationship between CG and EM, namely managerial ownership,
board composition and audit committee. Some corporate governance mechanisms are
often used in research to determine its effect on earnings management. The first is the
effectiveness of the board of directors in carrying out its functions because compliance
with accounting standards is not enough to ensure there is no manipulation in financial
statements [23] (Saleh et al., 2005). Second, the form of corporate governance, such
as structure and composition in effectively handle its monitoring responsibilities [20]
(Peasnell et al., 2005), or it may depend on the substance of corporate governance,
such as the persistence and directors’ bustle [24, 25], the proportion of independent
commissioners and audit committees will also help improve the financial reporting pro-
cess [26] (PGC, 2006).
H2: Corporate governance has an influence on earning management.
The role of auditor is to ensure that financial reporting has high quality. Audit commit-
tee served for supervise financial reporting and earning management practices. Audi-
tees with high accrual rates will most likely to receive qualified audit opinion. Accruals
are subjective estimates of managers for future results, so auditees with high accrual
rates have greater uncertainty than auditees with low accrual rates. Thus, auditor will
be more likely to issue qualified audit opinions for auditees with high accrual rates [27]
(Francis and Krishnan, 1999).
H3: Earning management has an influence on audit opinion.
As mentioned before, companies need to maximize their value. Agency conflict will
be appeared when shareholders rely on managers to provide services on their behalf
[28] ( Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Whereas from research conducted by [29] You et al.
(2003), agency problems arise when a manager has a shareholding of less than the
total equity of the company. To overcome this problem, companies need to implement
corporate governance. Corporate governance develops by relying on agency theory,
where the management of the company must be supervised and controlled to ensure
that the management is carried out in full compliance with the applicable rules and
regulations.
The rise and fall of corporate values and to reduce agency costs are influenced by
the ownership structure. [28] Jensen and Meckling (1976), states that the agency conflict
will occur when top managers’ proportionate shares of the company is less than 100%
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so it tends to act to pursue their own interests and is not based on maximizing the value
in making funding decisions.
H4: Corporate governance has an influence on firm value.
Firm value is used as a perception for investors in assessing the company feasibility.
One aspect that investors value over the company’s value is the transparency expressed
in the company’s annual report. Therefore, auditors are very reliable in providing good
information for investors [30] (Deegan, 2004).
H5: Firm Value has an influence on audit opinion.
Earning management strategy is used for increasing reported earnings in the current
period to make the company look better. Earning management conducted by company
management will increase the value of the company (Tobin’s Q) [31] (Morck Scheifer and
Vishny, 1988).
H6: Earning Management has an influence on Firm Value.
3. Research Design
3.1. Sample
Data used in this research is annual report from manufacturing companies which are
listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2009 – 2017. Criteria for data used are companies
which have done their Initial Public Offering (IPO) before the 2008 crisis and compa-
nies which provided thorough annual reports from 2009 – 2017. Data that matched the
criteria amounted to 79 companies.
3.2. Measurement of variables
Independent variables used in this research are corporate governance, earning man-
agement and firm valuewhile audit opinion becomes dependent variable. The following
is the operational definition of each variables:
3.2.1. Corporate governance
Corporate governance is measured using scoring techniques. Scoring is carried out on
the audit committee, independent commissioners and management ownership.
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3.2.2. Earning management
Earning management is measured using the Modified Jones Model formula for calculat-
ing discretionary accruals. This model is determined by [32] Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney
(1995) and extended by [33] Kothari, Leone, & Wasley (2005).
Total Accrual (TACC) = NI – CFO












+ 𝛼3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡



















According to [34] Siagian, Siregar, & Rahadian (2013) the firm value is measured using
Tobin’s Q with this formula:
Tobin’s Q = 𝑀𝑉𝐸 +𝐷𝐵𝑉𝐸 + 𝐷
3.2.4. Audit opinion
Audit opinion uses dummy variables. Companies which received a qualified audit opin-
ionwere given a score of 0 and the companywhich received an unqualified audit opinion
was rated 1.
4. Analysis and Results
Data analysis techniques consist of validity, collinearity, reliability testing and hypothesis
testing using WrapPLS. Analysis will be carried out with the help of WrapPLS software.
Evaluation of the measurement results in the form of an outer model and inner model or
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known as a structural model. The purpose of using WarpPLS is to predict the impact of
the independent variable (X) on the dependent variable (Y) and to explain the relation-
ship between these variable.
Table 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS.
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std.
Deviation
CG 711 2 3 2.505 0.5003
EM 711 –0.5 0.4 0.003 0.0845
FV 711 0.000793 0.81219 0.210 0.1767
OA 711 0.0 1.0 0.999 0.0375
Data of 79 manufacturing companies within 2009 – 2017 is used as sample with 711
observations. Description of earnings management variable produces an average value
of 0.003 with a standard deviation of 0.0845, the lowest earning management is of -0.5
owned by ALMI company in 2015 while in 2014 ALMI had a high earning management of
0.399. Description of firm value variables produces an average of 0.21 with a standard
deviation of 0.1767. The value of the lowest firm value is 0.001 owned by TBMS company
at 0.000793 in 2013. The highest value is owned by the TIRT company in 2013, which
amounted to 0.81219.




CG→ OA 0.025 0.254
CG→ EM –0.064 0.042**
EM→ OA 0.013 0.369
CG→ FV –0.148 < 0.001***
FV→ OA –0.092 0.007***
EM→ FV 0.096 0.005***
Note: ***significance at the 0.01 level; **significance at the 0.05
level.
Based on Table 2, the value of the path coefficients influence corporate governance
on audit opinion is 0.025 with a P value of 0.254 which is greater than 0.1. It shows that
there is no significant influence between corporate governance on audit opinion. Many
companies do corporate governance in order to deal with crisis, but auditors do not see
corporate governance as a reference in giving their opinions. The results of this research
are supported by a research conducted by [35] Chandra (2013) which shows that CG has
no significant influence on the provision of audit opinions. Based on the results of this
study, the first hypothesis states that corporate governance has an influence on audit
opinion is rejected.
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The value of the path coefficients of corporate governance influence on earnings
management is -0.064 with a P-value of 0.042 which is smaller than 0.05. This shows
that corporate governance negatively significant to earning management. This means
that the better corporate governance, the lower the earning management carried out by
the company. Companies implement corporate governance to deal with crisis in order
minimize manipulation action which can give a negative impact. The results of this study
are supported by research conducted by [36] Abdillah et al. (2014) which shows that
corporate governance has a negative effect on earnings management in manufacturing
companies listed in the Indonesia Stock Exchange. Based on these results, the second
hypothesis that suggests that corporate governance has an influence on earning man-
agement is accepted.
Based on the path coefficient value, the effect of earning management on audit opin-
ion is 0.013 with p-values of 0.369 which is greater than 0.1. This shows that there is
no significant influence between earnings management and audit opinion. It indicates
that the auditor can’t detect earning management practices carried out by the company
when facing a crisis. The results of this research are similar to the results of previous
research by [37] Tsipouridou & Charalambos (2013) which states that there is no sig-
nificant relationship between Earning Management and Audit Opinion. Based on these
results, the third hypothesis which states earnings management has an influence on
audit opinion is rejected.
The coefficient path value of the influence of corporate governance on firm value
is -0.148 with a significant level below 0.001 which is less than 0.01. This shows that
corporate governance negatively significant to firm value. There will be many decisions
that must be taken by management when facing financial crisis. An increase or change
in the board of commissioners will affect Tobin’s Q. The higher the number of com-
missioners, the lower the value of the company due to an agency conflict within the
company. Every stakeholder has different interests and causes management decisions
to be ineffective. In line with the research of [38] Wida & Suartana (2014) that man-
agerial ownership cannot reduce agency conflicts in companies in Indonesia and [39]
Fala’s (2007) research shows that the management structure of companies in Indonesia
has a cross directorship where there is a relationship between the company’s board
of commissioners and the company’s other boards of commissioners, as a company
commissioner A has a position in company B this can weaken the control and service
functions of the board of commissioners. In this condition, investors will reconsider their
investment decisions. Overall, the results of this study are supported by the research of
[40] Sarafina & Saifi (2017) which suggests a significant relationship between corporate
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governance and firm value. Based on these results, the fourth hypothesis which states
that corporate governance has an influence on firm value is accepted.
The value of the path coefficients of firm value influence on the audit opinion is -0.092
with a P-value of 0.007 which is less than 0.01. This shows that firm value negatively
significant to audit opinion. It means that the better company value does not affect the
results of the audit opinion given by the auditor. The results of this study are contradictory
to [41] Ardiana (2014) that good firm value tends to make companies get an unqualified
audit opinion. Based on these results, the fifth hypothesis which states that firm value
has an influence on audit opinion is accepted.
The path coefficients value of the influence of earning management on firm value is
0.096 with a P-value of 0.005 which is less than 0.01. This shows that earning manage-
ment positively significant to firm value. Its means companies which implement earning
management practices will increase the company value since investors respond pos-
itively to companies with great financial conditions. The company conducts earnings
management during or after the crisis with the aim of attracting investors to invest. The
results of this study are supported by research conducted by [42] Jiraporn (2008) and
[43] Raoli (2013) which found a positive relationship between earnings management and
firm value. However, [44] Junchristianti & Priyadi (2013) in their research shows that there
is a negative relationship between earningsmanagement and firm value. Based on these
results, the sixth hypothesis which states that earnings management affects firm value
is accepted and proven.






The value of Cronbach’s Alpha has fulfilled the rule of thumb in all four variables,
namely the value of Cronbach’s alpha > 0.6. These results indicate that the model in
this study is reliable.
Table 4: FULL COLLINEARTITY VIF.
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Based on the VIF value of each variable whose value is smaller than 5 and smaller
than 3.3 indicates that the variable is ideal, acceptable and does not occur any multi-
collinearity problems.





From the table above, it is known that the R-square value for earning management
is 0.004, meaning that the large percentage of influence of corporate governance on
earningsmanagement is 0.4%while the remaining 99.6% is explained by other variables.
The R square value for firm value is equal to 0.032, meaning that the percentage of the
influence of corporate governance on the firm value is 3.2% while the remaining 96.8%
is explained by other variables. From Table 5, the value of Q2 can be calculated the
following values:
Nilai 𝑄2 = 1 − [(1 − 0.004) × (1 − 0.032) × (1 − 0.01)] = 0.045
Value 𝑄2 > 0 means that this model is considered to have predictive relevance.
5. Conclusion
Auditor opinion is influenced only by the Firm Value. Although Firm Value is influence
by corporate governance and earnings management, it is better for auditor to consider
the extent of corporate governance practices and earnings management practices have
an impact on the audited financial statement.
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